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GRAZING IN THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS 
PRESERVATION SYSTEM 
PETER A. APPEL,* CHRISTOPHER BARNS** 
Abstract: The sole direction in the Wilderness Act of 1964 
concerning commercial livestock grazing in wilderness is 
forty words long: “Within wilderness areas in the national 
forests designated by this Act...the grazing of livestock, 
where established prior to September 3, 1964, shall be per-
mitted to continue subject to such reasonable regulations as 
are deemed necessary by the Secretary of Agriculture.” We 
discuss just what these words mean in the context of the 
law and the subsequent so-called Congressional Grazing 
Guidelines, and examine recent agency misinterpretations 
of this direction. 
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I. BACKGROUND OF GRAZING IN THE WILDERNESS ACT 
OF 1964 
The first wilderness bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate in 
June, 1956.1 It included direction on grazing: “Except as otherwise 
provided in this section...no portion of any area constituting a unit 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System shall be devoted 
to...grazing by domestic livestock (other than by pack animals in 
connection with the administration or recreational, educational, or 
scientific use of the wilderness).”2 Yet one page later, the bill con-
tinued: 
Within national forest areas grazing of domestic live-
stock...where [this practice has] already become well estab-
lished may be permitted to continue subject to such re-
strictions as the Chief of the Forest Service deems desira-
ble. Such practices shall be recognized as nonconforming 
use...and shall be terminated whenever this can be effected 
with equity to, or in agreement with, those making such 
use.3 
It is not surprising, given these somewhat contradictory direc-
tions for management, that livestock operators feared their graz-
ing would be curtailed. However, Howard Zahniser, executive di-
rector of the Wilderness Society and primary author of the initial 
wilderness bill, knew the bill had to contain provision for this ac-
tivity if it was to get out of the Interior committees in either the 
House or Senate.4 As he wrote to the Salt Lake Tribune in 1958, 
“We earnestly wish to be able to cooperate with livestock...interests 
in the development of a truly rational and enduring wilderness 
                                                          
 1. S. 4013, 84th Cong. (1956) (2nd Sess.). 
 2. Id. § 3(b). 
 3. Id., § 3(c)(2). 
 4. See MARK HARVEY, WILDERNESS FOREVER: HOWARD ZAHNISER AND THE PATH TO 
THE WILDERNESS ACT 204 (2005). 
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preservation program.”5 And so, despite Zahniser’s familiarity with 
past overgrazing problems on the federal lands, the grazing provi-
sion was clarified. 
Perhaps “clarified” is not quite accurate. “Simplified”—at least 
on paper if not on the ground—might be a better term. When 
passed into law,6 the Wilderness Act’s direction on the manage-
ment of commercial livestock grazing was a mere: “Within wilder-
ness areas in the national forests designated by this Act...the graz-
ing of livestock, where established prior to [September 3, 1964], 
shall be permitted to continue subject to such reasonable regula-
tions as are deemed necessary by the Secretary of Agriculture.”7 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GRAZING 
GUIDELINES 
In the fifteen years subsequent to the passage of 1964 Act, 
Congress wrestled with what it—and the country—wanted out of 
a National Wilderness Preservation System. Over agency objec-
tions, conservation organizations pressed for an expansive defini-
tion of wilderness that would open up opportunity for more areas 
                                                          
 5. Id. at 205 (citing Howard Zahniser, Letter to the Editor, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 
16, 1958). 
 6. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 88 Stat. 577 (1964) (codified as National Wil-
derness Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2012)). 
 7. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4) (2012). The United States Forest Service (USFS) is the 
only agency that manages national forests, and national forests were the only lands mentioned 
in the grazing provision. Agencies within the Department of the Interior that manage wilder-
ness—the National Park Service (NPS), the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)—were not originally included. Indeed, BLM was 
not mentioned at all in the Wilderness Act of 1964. At least one court has interpreted a refer-
ence to “national forests” in the Wilderness Act to apply only to lands that USFS manages and 
no others. See Brown v. U. S. Dep’t of Interior, 679 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, 
in section 603 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), Congress granted 
to BLM the authority to manage wilderness areas under its jurisdiction in a manner similar 
to that of USFS. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 603, 90 Stat. 2743, 2785 (1976). Specifically, subsection 
(c) of that section 603 provides: “Once an area has been designated for preservation as wilder-
ness, the provisions of the Wilderness Act which apply to national forest wilderness areas shall 
apply with respect to the administration and use of such designated area.” Id.; 43 U.S.C. § 
1782(c) (2012). 
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to be designated.8 The Eastern Wilderness Areas Act of 1975,9 es-
tablished congressional precedent that past uses of an area would 
not automatically preclude wilderness designation of areas that 
showed some evidence of human imprint. Similarly, the Endan-
gered American Wilderness Act of 1978,10 established that adjacent 
land use or activities would not automatically preclude wilderness 
designation. In the first case, Congress decided past “non-conform-
ing”11 uses within the area would not prevent wilderness designa-
tion; in the latter law, Congress decided that current “non-conform-
ing” uses outside the area would not prevent wilderness designa-
tion. But grazing was more complicated—a current and ongoing 
“non-conforming” use inside the area.12 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the USFS (the only agency 
at the time with commercial livestock grazing in it wilderness ar-
                                                          
 8. See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 186–93 
(1982). 
 9. National Wilderness Preservation System, Designation of Certain Lands, Pub. L. 
No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2096 (1975). “Eastern Wilderness Areas Act” is the Act’s generally ac-
cepted common name. 
 10. Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-237, 92 Stat. 40 
(1978). 
 11. Although it does not appear in the Wilderness Act as enacted, the term “non-
conforming use” was introduced by Zahniser in the first wilderness bill (see HARVEY, supra 
note 4), and is often used as short-hand for any wilderness use or activity that apparently 
diverges from those implied by the definition of “wilderness” found in the 1964 Act. See 16 
U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012). These non-conforming uses (as opposed to illegal uses) are provided 
for in 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) and § 1134. 
 12. Without the non-conforming use provision allowing it, the Wilderness Act would 
flatly prohibit the practice under section 4(c). 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012); Wilderness Act, Pub. 
L. No. 88-577, § 4(c), 88 Stat. 577, 894 (1964) (“Except as specifically provided for in this Act, 
and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise … within any 
wilderness area designated by this Act….”). Interestingly, the penultimate compromise bill of 
the Eastern Wilderness Areas Act would have eliminated grazing throughout the entire wil-
derness system. However, “[t]he preservationist lobby was not about to join in purifying the 
western wilderness areas of nonconforming uses at the expense of alienating supporters.  Too 
much purity meant too little wilderness.” ALLIN, supra note 8, at 191. Preservationists suc-
ceeded in getting this provision stripped from the final bill. Id. at 192. 
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eas) would permit grazing, but started phasing out related struc-
tures, installations, and motorized use13 as “prohibited uses” under 
Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act.14 Nor is it surprising that live-
stock permittees would object to such actions as making their op-
erations prohibitively expensive. After fifteen months of debate, 
Congress struck a compromise15 in the form of House Report 96-
617 referenced in the Colorado Wilderness Act of 1980.16 The sub-
stantive language of this Report was duplicated in House Report 
101-405, Appendix A, referenced in the Arizona Desert Wilderness 
Act of 1990.17 This Report is the one cited in subsequent bills, and 
is commonly referred to as the Congressional Grazing Guidelines 
(CGG). 
III. SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT PRESCRIPTIONS IN THE 
CONGRESSIONAL GRAZING GUIDELINES 
The CGG presents five “guidelines and policies”18 and a sum-
mary statement. 
“1. There shall be no curtailments of grazing ... simply because 
an area is, or has been designated as wilderness.”19 Reductions, 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestock in Wilderness: A Review and Forecast, 
20 ENVTL. L. 857, 866-868 (1990). 
 14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012) (“[E]xcept as necessary to meet minimum require-
ments for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter . . . there shall be no 
temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of 
aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any 
such area.”). 
 15. See McClaran, supra note 13, at 870. 
 16. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-560, § 108, 94 Stat. 3265, 3271 (1980) (“[W]ith-
out amending the Wilderness Act of 1964, with respect to livestock grazing... the provi-
sions...relating to grazing shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the guide-
lines contained ... in the House Committee Report (H. Report 96-617) accompanying this Act.”).   
 17. Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-628, § 101(f)(1), 104 Stat. 
4469, 4473 (1990). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 41 (1990). 
 19. Id. 
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generally to improve deteriorated resource conditions, “should be 
made as a result of revisions in the normal grazing and land man-
agement planning and policy setting process.”20 Increases are al-
lowable if there would be “no adverse impact” to wilderness char-
acter.21 While theoretically possible, it is difficult to see how any 
appreciable increase could occur in practical application under that 
restriction because it would almost certainly adversely affect wil-
derness character as a whole, and Section 4(b) of the Wilderness 
Act mandates that agencies preserve wilderness character.22 
“2. The maintenance of supporting facilities, existing in an 
area prior to its classification as wilderness. . . is permissible. . . . 
Where practical alternatives do not exist, maintenance or other ac-
tivities may be accomplished through the occasional use of motor-
ized equipment. . . . Such occasional use of motorized equipment 
should be expressly authorized,” and “should be based on a rule of 
practical necessity and reasonableness” where there are no “prac-
tical alternatives.”23 Some have argued that the CGG “largely re-
voked agency discretion”24 concerning facilities and activities. This 
is not the case. The agencies clearly maintain the ability to dictate 
frequency, timing, and degree of maintenance, as well as the 
method of accomplishing activities (for example, requiring the use 
of wheeled vehicles, rather than the environmentally more de-
structive tracked vehicles, to maintain a stock pond). 
“3. The replacement or reconstruction of deteriorated facili-
ties” should not require using “natural materials" unless “their use 
                                                          
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012); see generally PETER LANDRES, ET AL., Keeping 
It Wild 2: An Updated Interagency Strategy to Monitor Trends in Wilderness Character Across 
the National Wilderness Preservation System, FOREST SERV. GEN. TECH. REPT. RMRS-GTR-
340 (Oct. 2015), www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr340.pdf (for a detailed discussion of wilder-
ness character). 
 22. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012). 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 42 (1990). 
 24. McClaren, supra note 13, at 874. 
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would not impose unreasonable additional costs on grazing permit-
tees.”25 Because this guideline only addresses replaced or recon-
structed of deteriorated (i.e., preexisting) facilities, it does not ap-
ply to new facilities. These are covered in the fourth guideline. 
“4. The construction ... of new improvements should be primar-
ily for the purpose of resource protection and the more effective 
management of these resources rather than to accommodate in-
creased numbers of livestock.”26 In other words, new facilities can 
be allowed if and only if they are the minimum necessary to pre-
serve wilderness character; this restriction is not placed on the re-
pair “or replacement of deteriorated facilities.”27 
“5. The use of motorized equipment for emergency purposes 
such as rescuing sick animals or the placement of feed in emer-
gency situations is also permissible. This privilege is to be exer-
cised only in true emergencies, and should not be abused by per-
mittees.”28 
In summary, subject to the conditions and policies outlined 
in this report, the general rule of thumb on grazing man-
agement in wilderness should be that activities or facilities 
established prior to the date of an area's designation as wil-
derness should be allowed to remain in place and may be 
replaced when necessary.... Thus, if livestock grazing activ-
ities and facilities were established in an area at the time 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 872 n. 65. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. The Wilderness Act contains a comparable provision in Section 4(c), 16 U.S.C. 
1113(b), allowing the use of motorized equipment or motor vehicles for “measures required in 
emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area,” provided that the use 
of such equipment is “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the 
area for the purpose of this Chapter.” 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012). Although current agency 
practice is to perform programmatic minimum requirements analyses for search and rescue, 
that practice could be a way of implementing this guideline to ensure that permittees do not 
abuse it. 
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Congress determined that the area was suitable for wilder-
ness and placed the specific area in the wilderness system, 
they should be allowed to continue.29 
Taken out of context, this summary has caused great confu-
sion, as detailed below. The summary continues, “With respect to 
areas designated as wilderness prior to the date of this Act, these 
guidelines shall not be considered as a direction to reestablish uses 
where such uses have been discontinued.”30 In other words, preex-
isting activities, facilities—indeed, and even entire grazing allot-
ments—cannot be re-established in wilderness once they have 
been discontinued or abandoned. It is important to note, however, 
that the federal agency must formally recognize this cessation in 
either a grazing plan or land use plan amendment, and discontin-
uation or abandonment does not occur simply because a facility (or 
even an entire allotment) was not being used at the year of desig-
nation.31 
IV. RESIDUAL MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS 
Although the Congressional Grazing Guidelines (CGG) clari-
fied much of the intended management of commercial grazing op-
erations in wilderness, the agencies face resolving some potential 
questions that the CGG does not address directly. In our view, the 
text of the Wilderness Act, judicial interpretations, fair implica-
tions from the CGG, the general policies behind the Act provide 
clear guidance to the agencies in answering these questions. 
First, given the repeated emphasis in the CGG on past uses on 
wilderness allotments, can grazing be considered a “historical use” 
                                                          
 29. McClaren, supra note 13, at 874 n. 66. 
 30. Harold Shepard, Comment, Livestock Grazing in BLM Wilderness and Wilder-
ness Study Areas, 5 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 61, 65 n. 24 (1990). 
 31. See Ventana Wilderness All. v. Bradford, 313 Fed. App’x 944, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a “temporary cessation in grazing did not serve to discontinue the use, especially 
where the interruption was caused by the transition from private to public land, the Forest 
Service demonstrated an intent to allow grazing within a fairly short period after acquiring 
the property, even before the property was officially designated as wilderness”). 
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protected under Section (4b) of the Wilderness Act?32 No. The sec-
tion in question refers to public purposes.33 Commercial livestock 
grazing is a private purpose, and covered under Section 4(d)(4)(2) 
of the Act.34 To claim that grazing is protected as a historical use 
would mean that any previous use of a wilderness area would be 
similarly protected, which is clearly not the intent of the law. 
The CGG states that “livestock grazing activities. . . estab-
lished in an area”at the time Congress” designated it as wilderness 
“should be allowed to continue.”35 Therefore, shouldn’t all motor-
ized uses, including herding of livestock, that occurred prior to des-
ignation still be allowed?36 Again, our answer is: No. This argu-
ment conflates the activity with the method of accomplishing that 
activity. Here, the conflation is the activity—herding—with the 
method of accomplishing that—using motor vehicles. This is 
clearly not Congressional intent, as can be seen by looking at the 
example detailed in the second guideline: 
For example, motorized equipment need not be allowed for 
the placement of small quantities of salt or other activities 
where such activities can reasonably and practically be ac-
complished on horseback or foot. On the other hand, it may 
be appropriate to permit the occasional use of motorized 
equipment to haul large quantities of salt to distribution 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Int., Bur. Land Mgmt., Preliminary Environmental Assess-
ment for the Upper Bench, Lower Bench and Battleship Allotments Permit Renewal, DOI-
BLM-CO-N034-2015-0002-EA, at 72 (Jun. 2016) (concluding that the allotment permits 
should be renewed, in part, because “[l]ivestock grazing has been part of the history of [this] 
landscape since the late 1800’s”).  
 33. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, wilder-
ness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educa-
tional, conservation, and historical use”) [emphasis added]. 
 34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4)(2) (2014). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 43 (1990). 
 36. See Mark Squillace, Grazing in Wilderness Areas, 44 ENVTL. L. 415, 435 (2014) 
(“It would appear that motor vehicle use for herding animals that occurred before an area was 
designated wilderness is an activity that Congress expressly intended to allow to continue.”). 
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points. Moreover, under the rule of reasonableness, occa-
sional use of motorized equipment should be permitted 
where practical alternatives are not available.37 
Note that the decision on whether or not to use a motor vehicle 
to accomplish an action rests entirely on what the permittee can 
reasonably accomplish on horseback or foot, not on how the activity 
was accomplished prior to designation. In terms of herding live-
stock, it is obviously practical to do so without motor vehicles, as 
this was historically and is currently the method employed in hun-
dreds of wilderness grazing allotments across the country. Moreo-
ver, to conclude otherwise would ignore the admonition in guide-
line #5 of the CGG—“The use of motorized equipment [is a] privi-
lege is to be exercised only in true emergencies, and should not be 
abused by permittees”—would be meaningless.38 Few impacts to an 
area’s wilderness character would be more deleterious than allow-
ing routine motorized access, and it would require explicit author-
ization from Congress.39 
Since the Act states that “the grazing of livestock, where es-
tablished prior [designation of the area], shall be permitted to con-
tinue”40 and the CGG states that “there shall be no curtailments of 
                                                          
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 42 (1990). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Forest Jobs and Recreation Act, S. 1470, 111th Cong., § 202(n)(3)(B) (1st Sess. 
2009), (allowing “historical motorized access to trail sheep” and unlimited “motorized access to 
water infrastructure for cattle” “to preserve historic access for other ranching activities” in the 
proposed Snowcrest Wilderness); and Owyhee Wilderness Areas Boundary Modifications Act, 
S. 1167, 114th Cong., § 3 (2nd Sess. 2016), (as originally introduced, allowed “the use of motor 
vehicles for livestock monitoring, herding, and gathering” on an allotment within the Pole 
Creek and Owyhee River Wilderness areas). Neither bill (in any iteration) has been passed 
into law. Both these bills were supported by self-described conservation groups, and both were 
amended to allow those uses if the managing agency found them to be the minimum necessary 
under the CGG -- which, as we have shown, they cannot be. For a more detailed discussion on 
these and similar current compromises to wilderness character by some wilderness advocates, 
see Martin Nie & Christopher Barns, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Wilderness Act: The Next 
Chapter in Wilderness Designation, Politics, and Management, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
237, 278-90 (2014). 
 40. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 88 Stat. 577 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1131-1136 (2012)). 
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grazing...simply because an area is... wilderness,”41 can grazing 
ever be terminated in a wilderness? Here our answer is: Yes. Nev-
ertheless, the question remains as to under what circumstances. 
It is clear from the Guidelines that grazing cannot be unilat-
erally terminated except under the same conditions that would ap-
ply on non-wilderness lands. Such conditions would include failure 
to abide by permit conditions, or deteriorated conditions of the land 
(such as long-term habitat changes) that make the area no longer 
suitable for livestock grazing.42 
Originally, Zahniser’s draft bill envisioned that the federal 
agency could, with willing permittees, buy-out livestock operators 
or exchange operations within wilderness areas with ungrazed al-
lotments outside the wilderness.43 As noted, this provision does not 
appear in the final version of the Wilderness Act, and while the 
CGG does not address this directly, it would seem this circum-
stance was not anticipated as routine by Congress. To date, very 
few wilderness bills provide explicit direction to allow such ac-
tions.44 
However, what if a permittee wishes to “donate” a permit, 
without either exchange or other remuneration? The law says that 
where grazing was present prior to designation it “shall be permit-
ted to continue”, not that “it must be present in perpetuity.”45 
Surely Congress did not intend to force a permittee to run livestock 
                                                          
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 41 (1990). 
 42. See 36 C.F.R. § 222.4 (2016); 43 C.F.R. 4130.3-1(b), -3(a) (2016). 
 43. See HARVEY, supra note 4.  
 44. See Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-399, § 202(d)(2), 114 Stat. 1655, 1667 (2010) (“The Secretary shall permanently 
retire all grazing permits applicable to certain lands in the Wilderness Area, as depicted on 
the map referred to in section 101(a), and livestock shall be excluded from these lands.”); Om-
nibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 1503(b)(3)(D), 123 Stat. 991, 
1034–35 (2009) (in part, directing the Secretary to “accept the donation of any valid existing 
permits or leases authorizing grazing on public land, all or a portion of which is within the 
wilderness areas designated by this subtitle” and to “terminate the grazing permit or lease; 
and . . . ensure a permanent end to grazing on the land covered by the permit or lease”). 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4)(2) (2014). 
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against his wishes. But is such a desire by the permittee sufficient 
to then permanently retire the area from livestock grazing absent 
explicit direction from Congress to do so? Mark Squillace has out-
lined significant impediments to doing so, citing the Supreme 
Court decision in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt that “a permit 
holder is expected to make substantial use set forth in the grazing 
permit.”46  If Congress did not intend to force a permittee to run 
livestock, apparently the Supreme Court does. Presumably, the op-
erator wishing to “donate” his lease owns the base property, but 
Squillace argues that if the base property owner does not wish to 
exercise his permit, the federal agency “has the authority—and 
perhaps even the duty—to lease the land to a third party who does 
want to graze.”47 
However, what is also clear is that the federal agency has the 
authority to formally determine that an area in question is no 
longer chiefly valuable for grazing, a necessary precursor to clear-
ing the way for the permanent retirement of the associated lease. 
The catch is that the CGG makes it clear that the designation of 
an area as wilderness is, in and of itself, insufficient for such a de-
termination.48 The agency would have to find that other rationales 
are at play, for example that the area is more valuable for provid-
ing forage for native species or other conservation and ecological 
reasons, or that eliminating grazing would reduce visitor conflicts, 
or that it would simply restore a more natural environment by re-
moving the infrastructure a grazing operation might require. 
While these rationales are compatible with wilderness designation, 
they are not a sine qua non of designation. 
Courts have approved of agencies taking actions that extend 
beyond the original statutory provisions protecting a wilderness 
area. For example, in a somewhat related situation, USFS closed a 
                                                          
 46. Squillace, supra note 36, at 440–442. 
 47. Id. at 442 [emphasis added]. 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 101-405, at 41 (1990) (“There shall be no curtailments of grazing 
in wilderness areas simply because an area is, or has been designated at wilderness. . .”). 
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trail outside, but leading to, the Glacier Peak Wilderness to motor-
ized trailbikes to reduce user conflict.49 An off-highway vehicle as-
sociation sued, claiming that finding conflict was arbitrary and ca-
pricious, and that singling out their user-group created a “buffer 
zone” explicitly prohibited in the Washington State Wilderness Act 
of 1984.50 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that USFS 
had ample evidence of user conflict. As for the buffer zone: 
To the extent an activity is prohibited on land adjacent to a 
Wilderness area solely because of its potential effect on the 
Wilderness area, the prohibition would likely violate the 
Wilderness Act's prohibition of buffer zones. However, if an 
activity is prohibited, in part, for reasons other than the 
possible effect that activity will have on an adjoining Wil-
derness area, it is not an impermissible buffer zone under 
the Wilderness Act. The Wilderness Act clearly prohibits 
use restrictions on nonwilderness areas based solely on the 
potential impact that use might have on the Wilderness. 
Congress' intent on this point is manifested through its ex-
press language in section 9 of the [Washington] Wilderness 
Act: "The fact that nonwilderness activities or uses can be 
seen or heard from areas within the wilderness shall not, of 
itself, preclude such activities or uses up to the boundary of 
the wilderness area." (Emphasis added.) When Congress 
used the words "of itself," it implicitly stated that the effects 
on a Wilderness area can be considered when allocating 
uses of adjoining nonwilderness area, so long as it is not the 
only reason. Therefore, contrary to the Plaintiff's position, 
the Wilderness Act does not prevent the Forest Service from 
considering the Wilderness classification of adjoining land 
as a factor in developing the Land and Resource Manage-
ment Plan for the non-wilderness area.51 
Similarly, the basic fact that Congress has declared an area to 
be wilderness is not sufficient to curtail grazing, but neither must 
                                                          
 49. Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. USDA, 18 F.3d 1468, 1470–71 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1480–81. 
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the agency treat that fact as irrelevant if it has specific reasons to 
limit or terminate grazing in a particular wilderness area. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the Wilderness Act, Congress exempted some activities that 
the Act would otherwise bar either to promote use and enjoyment 
of the lands,52 or to allow preexisting, nonconforming activities to 
continue under some circumstances. Grazing constitutes one of the 
more troublesome of these activities, and Congress—through both 
the language of the Act and through enforceable guidelines—has 
struck a balance between allowing this activity under the right 
conditions and limitations. Agencies that oversee grazing within 
wilderness should not lose track of Congress’s ultimate definition 
of wilderness, and its overriding command to them that they pre-
serve wilderness character of the areas under their care.53 Alt-
hough the Wilderness Act did not by any means eliminate grazing 
in wilderness, agencies should not simply accept grazing as “busi-
ness as usual” without thinking critically about the role that wil-
derness designation generally and the particular features and 
needs of an area when making decisions about how to strike a 
properly protective balance. 
                                                          
 52. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (2012) (permitting “[c]ommercial services [to] be 
performed within the wilderness areas designated by this [Act] to the extent necessary for 
activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the 
areas”). 
 53. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b), (c) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (2012). 
